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In developing economies, workers often find jobs through a referral from a per-
son already employed by the recruiting firm. In the World Bank’s 2006 Micro-
Enterprise Survey for India, between 40% and 65% of new hires were recruited
through the social network of a workplace insider. In Beaman and Magruder’s
(2012) sample from Kolkata, 45% of employees had helped a friend or relative find
a job with their current employer. While the importance of workplace referrals
is widely acknowledged, it is more contested why this recruitment strategy is so
widely used.
A large literature has examined the role of social networks for candidates search-
ing for a job and employers looking to hire. During job search, networks may
provide valuable information about job openings (Granovetter 1973, 1995; Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson 2004; Wahba and Zenou 2005; Topa 2011). For employers,
disseminating vacancy information through employee networks is easy and inex-
pensive. Alternately, if employee networks are assortatively matched, firms can
mobilise the networks of more able or productive staff to find new recruits with
similar traits (Montgomery 1991; Fafchamps and Moradi 2015). Referral-based re-
cruitment may also provide job candidates with more accurate information about
a workplace, thereby improving the quality of the recruit-workplace match (Si-
mon and Warner 1992). A downside is that recruiting through referral may involve
favoritism, which can be costly for firms (Bramoulle and Goyal 2016).
In this paper we propose an alternative explanation, that workplace referrals can
reduce agency costs in employment relations. In our model, an employer uses
efficiency wages to align worker and firm interests: we show that the required
wage can be lowered if the employer recruits through a workplace insider. To
take full advantage of this mechanism, the employer should ask a staff member of
stature - who stands to lose if the new recruit underperforms - to act as referee.
We show that a strong social tie between the referee and the recruit will be optimal
for the firm. In contrast to the existing literature, we account for referee incentives
to act in accordance with the employer’s preferred scheme.
The mechanism we explore has been touched upon by Kajisa (2007), and is studied
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by Kugler (2003), Iversen, Sen, Verschoor and Dubey (2009) and Heath (2018).
Kugler (2003) and Heath (2018) both assume that referee incentives are satisfied.
Our paper adds new theoretical insights by endogenising the referee’s incentives
and the strength of the tie between the employee referee and the new recruit.
Our referral mechanism appears to be particularly relevant for low and unskilled
urban labor markets in developing country settings, where retention and labor
management challenges loom large because of strenuous jobs, acute informational
constraints and the dominance of informal and incomplete labor contracts.1
While it is well known that efficiency wages can reduce absenteeism and labor
turnover (Salop 1979), their relevance for handling labor management challenges
during modernity transitions has received limited attention (e.g. Kerr, Dunlop,
Harbison and Myers 1966). In Pollard’s (1963) account of the early industrial
revolution, workers unaccustomed to the discipline requirements on the factory
floor had highly erratic attendance and 50% absenteeism on a given day was not
unusual. ’Stable’ workers were therefore coveted by employers, echoing sentiments
among Mumbai employers two centuries later (Holmstrom 1984). For some of
the jobs reported on below, about 30% of the new recruits had left within six
months of joining their new workplace. This notable instability resonates with
official turnover statistics in India (e.g. Annual Survey of Industries 2011-12) and
observations from comparable settings elsewhere (Blattman and Dercon 2018).
We contrast the predictions of our model, first, with hiring patterns in a data
set containing in-depth information on how low and unskilled migrants from a
deprived area of rural North-India found their first migrant jobs. We observe
widespread job entry through a workplace insider and strong referee-recruit social
1In 2000-01, 86% of India’s manufacturing workers were employed in 17 million small and
informal enterprises with the remaining 14% working for 0.13 million formal enterprises (Kot-
wal, Ramaswami and Wadhwa 2011). Holmstrom (1984) provides a series of examples of how
employers in India use referrals to tackle moral hazard, including from van der Veen (1979, 64-
65): ’It is a generally accepted policy among managers to accept labourers on recommendation
and as groups. The managers of the above-mentioned factories could tell me how everyone of
their workers (from 12 to 35) had been introduced. They really prefer to utilize these personal
relationships, because it gives them a much stronger grip on their labourers. ’When one man
misbehaves, I hold the one who introduced him responsible, and that man will keep the mischief-
maker in check’, said one manager.’ See also the appeal to kinship morality to galvanise employee
effort and attendance among dyeing industry employers in Tamil Nadu (De Neve 2008).
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ties. While recruitment is mainly into bottom tier jobs, the typical referee is a
firm insider in a high stake job. These seemingly counterintuitive patterns agree
with our theory, but are hard to reconcile with rival explanations for referral.2
We then provide regression-based assessments of our theory and of the main rival
explanations. Using data on worker ability, we first evaluate Montgomery’s (1991)
influential screening or selection explanation for referral and find no support for
this theory or for other rival accounts. We proceed to study the performance of
referral wage penalty and job turnover predictions. While caveats about repre-
sentativity and sample size are necessary, we find suggestive, additional support
for our theory, but mainly for recruitment into bottom tier jobs.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our main contri-
bution, a new theory of employee referral. Section 3 provides a condensed review
of the literature. To assess the relevance of our theory, we first review other em-
pirical evidence supportive of the moral hazard explanation. We then describe the
context, introduce our data-set and report descriptive statistics on referral preva-
lence and the social ties between referees and recruits. To obtain clues about
referee stakes, we compare the jobs of workplace intermediaries with the jobs of
new recruits. Starting with a table summary of the predictions of our model
and of the main rival referral explanations, section 4 first examines whether rival
explanations can also account for the strong tie and high stake referee hiring pat-
terns in our data. This is followed by the regression-based empirical assessments.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A theory of employee referral
Consider a firm that needs to fill a vacancy. No specific skills are required, but
worker opportunism is costly for the employer. The firm can hire in the spot
market or through employee referral. In the first of two periods, the firm decides
2Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat and Szeidl (2009) contend that network based trust should be
more important for high-skilled jobs where the employer’s profits are more sensitive to worker
type; for low-skilled jobs, where type matters less, weak connections are best. Put differently,
there should be few referrals in the mainly low and unskilled jobs and labor markets we study
here.
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whether to recruit through the spot market or employee referral. In each case, the
firm offers a contract which can be of two types: (1) an efficiency wage contract
with a higher wage but where the worker is fired if caught misbehaving or (2) a
contract paying the worker’s reservation wage (normalized to 0).
Labour supply for such unskilled jobs is infinite, so that the odds of a worker
finding a job paying efficiency wages through anonymous search are zero: the
probability of an employer finding a worker in the spot market is 1. The worker
can always find employment at the 0 reservation wage.3 Conditional on recruiting
through referral, the employer can make (request) referral specific transfers to
(from) the referee who gets the opportunity to recruit from his network.
In the second period workers choose behaviour, the employer checks performance
and pays the corresponding wages.
2.1 Efficiency wages with and without referrals
The new worker produces a profit e−w if he behaves well and 1−w if he misbe-
haves, where e > 1 and w is the worker‘s wage. The costs to the firm of worker
misconduct are c = (e − 1). The worker gains αc if he behaves opportunisti-
cally, with α < 1.4 The firm monitors employees and detects misconduct with a
given probability q ∈ (0, 1). A worker caught misbehaving loses his job and gets
a reservation utility equal to 0.
Efficiency wage in the spot market
If the worker behaves well, his payoff is the (efficiency) wage ws while his expected
payoff if misbehaving is (1 − q)ws + αc. The spot market efficiency wage is the





3Hence, the bargaining power lies with employers; our results are not sensitive to this distri-
bution of bargaining power.
4This is equivalent to assuming that the cost of effort is αc.
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The efficiency wage is increasing in the opportunity cost of behaving well, and
decreasing in the probability of being detected when misbehaving.
Efficiency wages with employee referrals
A key feature of employee referral is that the firm can sanction both the referee
and the new recruit if the latter misbehaves. That is, the referee becomes an
insurance against recruit misbehaviour since he will suffer a loss in income, pro-
motion prospects and workplace stature if his recommended worker misbehaves.
The recruit’s sensitivity to this loss increases with the strength of the social tie to
the referee. To formalize, let ρ measure the social proximity between referee and
recruit; a higher ρ indicates a stronger social tie (closer kinship or friendship).
Let R denote the potential loss to the referee if the new worker misbehaves.5 A
well-behaved referred worker is paid the wage wr, while the expected wage if mis-
behaving is (1− q)wr + αc+ q (−ρR). The referral efficiency wage, the minimum
wage that ensures worker compliance, is given by
wr(ρ) = ws − ρR. (2)
Equation (2) shows that the employer can offer a lower wage to prevent misconduct
when hiring through employee referral.6 This is similar to Kugler (2003), but the
mechanism is different. In Kugler (2003), peer pressure makes it costly for the
new recruit to exert less effort than the referee: by selecting a referee exerting peer
pressure through own high effort, the employer can ensure higher recruit effort at
a lower cost. In contrast, in our set-up, the strength of the social tie between the
referee and the new recruit determines the social pressure. This social pressure
intensifies further with referee stakes, captured by R: the higher these stakes, the
lower the referral efficiency wage.
In Heath (2018), as in our model, referees understand that they can be punished
5While we are agnostic about their origins, another possible source of referee rents is the
same as for the potential recruit: efficiency wages to prevent opportunistic behavior.
6A lower wage implies that there are instances when referrals enhance efficiency. Since α < 1
it is always efficient for the worker to exert effort, but the employer will only choose to induce
worker effort if ws ≤ c. Hence, referral based hiring enhances efficiency if ws > q > wr(ρ).
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if their recommended worker misbehaves. However, in her model there is no role
for referee incentives or for the strength of ties. Neither Kugler (2003) nor Heath
(2018) consider referee incentives explicitly, which we analyze next.
2.2 Referee incentives
Absent any referee incentive problems, the employer wants the strongest possible
tie between referee and recruit to minimize the referral efficiency wage. It is not,
however, obvious that referee and employer interests about the preferred strength
of this tie are aligned. If not, we need to examine how the employer can induce
strong tie referrals and whether this is profitable.
We consider two types of referral related transfers that affect referee utility. The
referee may receive transfers from the recommended worker and his family and
network. We denote these transfers B(ρ) = v(ρ)+b(ρ) where v captures the social
utility accruing to a referee from helping someone in his network find a job. Social
status, approval and reciprocal aid are captured by this term. Helping someone
into a job may also provide the referee with intrinsic utility (“warm glow” altruism
- see Andreoni (1990)). With these interpretations, it is reasonable to assume that
v(ρ) is increasing in ρ. The second term, b, captures monetary transfers (bribes)
the worker may pay the referee.7 It is reasonable to assume that the referee can
claim a fraction of the wage premium a referred worker receives in his new job.8
For the rest of the paper, we assume that b(ρ) = γρwr(ρ), with γρ < 1.
In addition, the employer may also make referral related transfers. Let T (ρ) be
the monetary equivalent of the transfer the employer offers (demands from) the
referee if the recommended worker is hired.
7Since the game is modelled as one shot, we have not distinguished between one time pay-
ments and the present value of future payments. Indeed, it would make sense for the worker
to pay the referee a one time bribe to get the job. On the other hand, the wage and the non-
monetary benefits are a per period payment to the worker while the referee receives a one shot
payment from the firm T(ρ) to induce him to bring the right (strong social tie) worker to the
firm. We can therefore interpret the one shot payoffs as the equivalent annualised value of the
lump sum payments.
8In an adverse selection model of referral, Karlan et al (2009) assume, similarly, that a recruit
can bribe the referee to portray him as high-skilled. The bribe is a fraction of the wage premium
high-skilled workers earn.
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The referee’s utility (the part affected by the referral decision) is given by U(ρ) =
R + B(ρ) + T (ρ) and the referral related profit for the employer is given by
Π (ρ) = e − wr(ρ) − T (ρ). In the analysis below, we assume only two strengths




, with ρH > ρL. Our results extend to cases with
more fine grained social connections.
2.3 Complete information
Solving for the sub-game perfect equilibrium of this two stage game, notice that in
the last period ρ has already been chosen, so wr(ρ) is the minimum efficiency wage
for a given ρ. In the first stage, the employer chooses ρ to maximize Π (ρ). For
a fixed ρ, maximizing profits implies paying the referee the minimum to induce
his participation: Let U(0) = R denote the referee’s utility if he declines to refer
a worker. Participation requires U(ρ) = U(0) ⇒T (ρ) = −B(ρ) and the employer






















We know from (2) that the first bracket term is positive. The second term can
be negative or positive depending on whether social utility or the ’bribe’ from the
recruit dominates. If B(ρH) > B(ρL), the employer prefers strong ties since this
will reduce wage costs for both recruit and referee. If, however, B(ρH) < B(ρL),
the employer may want the referee to choose a worker he is weakly tied to. When
could this happen? Recall that we assumed b(ρ) = γρwr(ρ), with γρ < 1. If the
fraction of wages the referee receives is independent of the strength of the social
tie, the employer always prefers a strong tie referee-recruit relationship. But if γH
is sufficiently lower than γL, the employer will prefer a weak social tie since this
facilitates extracting the larger “bribe” the referee is paid by the recruit. A weak
tie is preferred if wr(ρL)− wr(ρH) ≤ B(ρL)−B(ρH), i.e. if:
ws(γL − γH)− (v(ρH)− v(ρL))
ρH(1− γH)− ρL(1− γL) > R. (3)
The employer prefers a weak tie referee-recruit relationship if referee stakes are
sufficiently low.
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Recall that with the spot market efficiency wage contract, employer profits are
Π(0) = e− ws. Hence, Π(ρ)− Π(0) = ρR − T (ρ) = ρR + B(ρ) > 0, regardless of
the strength of ties chosen in equilibrium. To summarize, employers always prefer
referrals to the spot market, conditional on the use of efficiency wage contracts.
However, the choice of strong or weak ties depends on whether referee utility is
increasing or decreasing in ρ. If referee utility is increasing in ρ, strong ties are
preferred while if referee utility is decreasing in ρ, strong ties are preferred only if
R is sufficiently large.
2.3.1 Collusion between referee and recruit
Employers are unlikely to have complete information about a candidate referee’s
social network. It might be common knowledge that everyone has a weak tie
person they can recommend, but not everyone has a suitable person they are
strongly tied to: everyone has a ρL in their network, but whether there is a ρH is
only known by the referee.
Assume first that the employer can verify the true social tie once the worker is
introduced. This takes us back to the complete information case since the contract
the employer offers the referee can be made contingent on the strength of the tie.
Whichever social tie the employer prefers, he offers the referee a contract Θ ={
T (ρL) = −B(ρL), T (ρH) = −B(ρH)
}
that guarantees the referee his reservation
utility R whether he recommends a recruit he is strongly or weakly tied to. With
this contract, he is willing to bring the tie the employer prefers.
A more interesting situation arises if the employer is unable to verify the true
social tie. With asymmetric information, the employer may have to provide the
referee with incentives to disclose the true social tie. To illustrate, assume that
B(ρH) ≥ B(ρL) and the employer prefers strong ties with complete information.
When the employer cannot verify the social tie, a referee offered the above contract
will recommend a ρH person but misrepresent the tie as ρL.
To characterize the optimal contract, let U(ρ, ρ̂) represent referee utility if he
refers a worker with social tie ρ but presents the tie as ρ̂. We have U(ρH , ρL) =
v(ρH) + b(ρH) +T (ρL) and U(ρH , ρH) = v(ρH) + b(ρH) +T (ρH). To induce truth-
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ful reporting U(ρH , ρH) ≥ U(ρH , ρL), hence the employer must choose T (ρH) ≥
T (ρL). Exploiting the fact that the participation constraint requires T (ρL) =
−(v(ρL) + b(ρL)), implies T (ρH) ≥ −(v(ρL) + b(ρL)). This (incentive) constraint
binds iff B(ρH) ≥ B(ρL).
The cost minimizing contract disclosing the strong social tie is given by Θ̃ ={
T (ρL) = −B(ρL), T (ρH) = −B(ρL)
}
. It is easy to check that this contract does
not give a referee with a weak tie to the recruit an incentive to misrepresent the
tie (even if he could). Given B(ρH) ≥ B(ρL) and wr(ρH) < wr(ρL), the employer
will offer a contract that induces a referee with a strong social tie to reveal the
true tie.








= wr(ρL)−wr(ρH) > 0.







> 0 which exceeds the incomplete information case, since the
employer needs to leave a “referral” rent equal to the difference B(ρH) − B(ρL)
to the referee (a rent above R) to induce him to reveal that the worker is ρH .
Suppose instead that B(ρL) > B(ρH) and R is sufficiently small. With complete
information, the employer prefers a weak tie referral since he can extract the
entire surplus accruing to the referee. This is not possible when information is
incomplete, since T (ρH) = T (ρL) = −B(ρH). Hence, with incomplete information
and B(ρL) > B(ρH), the employer will prefer strong ties.
Another way to state this result is that collusion between referee and recruit
can reduce the employer’s ability to extract rents: a direct implication is that
employers always prefer strong ties in the presence of collusion. Moreover, as
before, the minimum gain from referrals relative to the spot market is Π(ρ) −
Π(0) = ρR > 0 so that conditional on efficiency wage contracts being used,
employers always prefer referrals.
2.3.2 Referee risk
We started off asking why referees should agree to refer given the risk of losing
rents or employer goodwill. Informal conversations with individuals who agreed
and declined offers to recruit for their firm show that this is a real concern. This
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risk is not captured in our model, since on the equilibrium path the worker never
misbehaves. This section introduces the possibility of mistakes or accidents even
if the recruit never misbehaves, so that the referee, more realistically, is exposed
to risk when recommending a worker.
Suppose that the inspection technology is faulty and there is a chance ε, condi-
tional on inspection, that the worker is charged even if he didn’t misbehave. The
spot market payoff for a well-behaved worker now becomes ((1− q) + q (1− ε))ws.





Referral efficiency wages must now satisfy wr ((1− q) + q(1− ε)) ≥ wr(1 − q) +
αc+ (1− q)ρR, which gives a referral efficiency wage:
w(ρ) = wS − ρR
as before.
The referee’s participation constraint will change since he must be compensated
for the risk incurred when agreeing to be a referee. Participation requires U(ρ)(1−
q + q(1 − ε)) ≥ U(0), i.e. U(ρ) ≥ U(0)1−ε > U(0). Thus, the firm must pay T (ρ) =
U(0)
1−εq − U(0) − B(ρ) to ensure referee participation. Substituting for U(0) = R,





denote the employer’s optimal choice of ρ. Assuming complete
information (results easily extend to incomplete information), referral is now pre-
ferred by the employer if Π(ρ) − Π(0) = (e− wr(ρ∗)− T (ρ∗)) − (e− wS) > 0.
Hence, using the expression for T (ρ∗) derived from the participation constraint,
a sufficient condition for preferring referral, conditional on the use of efficiency
wage contracts, is that
ρ∗ ≥ εq(1− εq) (1− γ) ≡ ρ̂.
Referee rewards for referral increase by εqR1−εq compared to the no-risk benchmark.
Note that the relationship between the referral efficiency wage and the spot market
efficiency wage is unaffected. Hence the employer’s choice between a strong or
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weak tie referral is not affected by the type of risk examined here.
We conclude that when referral exposes a referee to a positive risk of losing work-
place rents, referrals remain cheaper than the spot market as long as the social
tie is sufficiently strong , i.e. when the feasible ρ > ρ̂.
2.4 Non-efficiency wage contracts
So far we have established that conditional on efficiency wages, referrals are prefer-
able to anonymous hiring. It is straightforward to show that when the costs of
opportunism to employers are sufficiently low, employers prefer paying workers
their reservation wage. If employers pay reservation wages, ΠS = 1: with effi-
ciency wages and referral, profits are Π(ρ) = e− wr(ρ∗)− T (ρ∗). Thus efficiency
wages are preferred when Π(ρ) ≥ 1. With no mistakes in detecting misbehaviour
, Π(ρ)−ΠS = c− αcq +ρ
∗R+B(ρ∗). This expression is positive if α
q
< 1, i.e. as long
as the detection probability exceeds α. With a positive probability of mistakes,
we get α(1−ε)q < 1 . In general, when the worker’s opportunity cost of misbehaving
is given by wS, efficiency wages are optimal whenever c ≥ wS−ρ∗R−B(ρ∗)≡ c̄. It
is evident that c̄ is decreasing in R. Moreover, if the referee’s utility is increasing
in ρ, c̄ is decreasing in ρ as well.
Summing up, our theory requires that the referee and the new recruit are in the
same workplace. To align referee and employer incentives, the referee should have
high stakes and stand to lose if the new recruit underperforms. We expect a strong
social tie between the referee and the recruit.
For the recruit wage, a referral wage premium or penalty are both possible. From
above, it follows that employers will pay efficiency wages in jobs where the costs of
opportunism exceed a threshold: below this threshold, paying efficiency wages will
not be worthwhile. For jobs below the threshold, our theory predicts a referral
wage premium: the worker will either be hired through referral and offered an
efficiency wage contract or hired anonymously and paid the reservation wage.
Notice that firms will pay efficiency wages – also in the spot market - for jobs
where the costs of opportunism are sufficiently high: in such jobs our theory
predicts a referral wage penalty.
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3 Empirical evidence
Our theory delivers distinct empirical predictions. To assess the theory’s rele-
vance, we first review other evidence supportive of the moral hazard explanation.
We then introduce the context, our primary data-set and descriptive statistics fo-
cusing on ’the same workplace’, ’strong social tie’ and ’high stake referee’ predic-
tions. We carefully assess whether our theory is consistent with these descriptives.
3.1 Other evidence supportive of the moral hazard expla-
nation
Montgomery’s (1991) selection or screening model provides an influential explana-
tion for hiring via referral and prior evidence on the relevance of the moral hazard
explanation is scant. Using a population wide and employer-employee matched
data-set from Sweden, Kramarz and Skans (2014) (KS from now) find strong so-
cial ties to be a key determinant of where young workers get their first job. Social
ties are more important when the recruit’s position is weak (low education, long
unemployment spells) and social tie effects more pronounced for a parent with
high status in the firm which is captured by a higher wage or longer tenure. Soon
after the child is hired, the parent experiences a wage reduction while the referred
child’s wage is lower than the wage of similar level entrants.
Although KS cite Montgomery (1991) to pinpoint the mechanism of interest,
their findings are at odds with a pure selection story. As KS recognise, two key
observations - that new recruits have lower observable skills and that both the
employee referee and the recruit experience a wage penalty - are inconsistent with
Montgomery’s (1991) prediction of a wage premium for both the referee and the
recruit. The KS findings are, however, partly consistent with our model which, in
this example, would predict referee and recruit wage penalties.9
9This reflects an element of joint liability in our model where the referee accepts the full risk
and may be sanctioned by the employer - through a wage penalty - if the recruit underperforms.
In the KS example, the recruit wage penalty reflects the recruit’s lower skills. A distinguishing
feature of our theory is that it predicts a recruit wage penalty also for a recruit with the same
ability and qualifications as other new hires.
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Heath (2018) reports a moral hazard channel in referrals in Bangladeshi garment
factories. She postulates that high ability employees will be induced to accept
contracts that offer implicit joint liability with the new recruit. Captured by pos-
itively correlated referee and recruit wages, she finds that the referee is punished
when the recruit underperforms. Her model also predicts more variance in referee
wages which is supported by her data. In Heath’s (2018) theory, however, referee
incentives are not modelled. She reports evidence of strong ties between referees
and recruits, which is what our (but not her) model predicts in order to satisfy
the referee’s participation constraint.
Antoninis (2006) argues that social networks such as family and close friends are
particularly useful for recruitment into low skilled jobs, where ability is claimed
to matter less. Using data from an Egyptian manufacturing firm, he finds that
new recruits referred by an employee with direct experience of their productivity
are paid higher starting wages: when referred by friends and relatives (as in our
moral hazard explanation), a wage penalty is more likely.10 He also emphasizes
the distinction in referrals between high-skill and low-skill jobs where - as in our
study - both the type of vacancy and the type of network called upon is relevant
for distinguishing situations where wage premia and wage penalties are expected.
Further and when the social tie between the referee and the recruit is strong (e.g.
family as opposed to co-workers), referrals are likely to be in low skilled jobs
where recruits are likely to experience wage penalties. Antoninis (2006) does not
provide an explanation for these results which, we argue, will be consistent with
our moral hazard explanation as long as referred and non-referred workers have
similar ability and other productive traits.
10This could simply reflect favoritism and that these new recruits are less productive than
others. Such referrals are costly for the firm. Pistaferri (1999) similarly documents a wage
penalty for workers recommended by family and friends but is unable to control for worker
ability. These facts are consistent with our explanation but since the two studies lack information
about worker ability or productivity, it is not possible to distinguish between our moral hazard
and a favoritism explanation for referral.
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3.2 Referrals for migrant workers: data and descriptive
statistics
3.2.1 Data and context
Our data-set is from two villages in Bijnor district in western Uttar Pradesh (UP),
an impoverished rural setting with an interesting social and religious blend.11 At
41%, Bijnor district has the third highest percentage of Muslims in the popu-
lation in UP. The largest Muslim group in our study villages are the Ansaris
(Julahas), traditionally a weaving community. Jats, the main local landowners,
and Chamars, who are Scheduled Castes and traditional leatherworkers, are the
most conspicuous Hindu communities.
We surveyed a random sample of households in Kasba Kotra and Jagannathpur
villages in Nagina tehsil and conducted separate interviews with household mem-
bers with a labour migration history.12 Among the 316 individuals with a labour
migration history, only two were women. Through repeated village visits and
tracing in e.g. Chandigarh, Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, nearby Haridwar and known
local factory clusters, we were able to interview 287 or 90.8% of these migrants.
The first interviews were conducted in May 2009, the last in February 2010.
Each migrant was interviewed in depth, with special emphasis on the process of
entering the first migrant job. To illustrate, we asked whether the first migrant
job was pre-arranged, whether the migrant received a job offer and if the person
who made the offer was working for the migrant’s first destination employer. If the
person was working for the destination employer, we defined these as workplace
referrals, of which employee referral forms a subset.13 For the person making the
11UP has the highest prevalence of stunting (47 %) among children (< 3 years) in India and
well documented quality shortfalls in public services, including government schools (e.g. Dreze
and Gazdar 1998).
12An individual is understood to have a labour migration history if he has spent a minimum
of one month continuously living away from the village for employment purposes. Following
Winters et al (2001), we define a household as (i) people living under the same roof and who eat
from the same kitchen and (ii) offspring or other family members who would otherwise reside
with the unit in (i) but who have migrated for work.
13The term workplace referral captures that a workplace referee may be an employee of the
firm or the firm owner. Notice that owners have particularly strong incentives to recruit well on
the firm’s behalf.
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job offer on behalf of a firm, information was collected from the migrant on the
relationship to the migrant and on the referee’s job (job title) within the recruiting
firm.14
Similar information was collected for what we call main contacts, described be-
low. In-depth information was also collected on e.g. migrant education, work
experience, career path and skills along with proxies for individual unobservables
expected to matter in these employment relations, including a Raven-type ability
test which is discussed in detail below.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents information on the first migrant jobs and sector of work by
social group. The concentration of Ansaris - traditionally a weaving community -
in bakery jobs is noteable.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 panel a) shows that first migrations are spread out in time, with the
main bulk occurring during the last decade. Compared to other studies (e.g.
Lucas 1997), the age at first migration is low. Panel b) shows the high proportion
of first migrants in the 15-20 age range and the significant numbers also below
that.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 panel a) and FIGURE 1 panel b) ABOUT HERE]
The youngest migrants are concentrated in the Ansari-dominated bakery sector
which absorbed about two-thirds of this group.
14In this retrospective migrant sample, the timing of the first labour migration stretches from
1950 till 2009. Given this spread, recall poses a methodological hazard. Testing recall among
migrants, Smith and Thomas (2003) found that subjects recall salient moves more accurately:
the first migrations analysed here are typically salient.
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3.4 The role of social networks in getting the first migrant
job
Table 2 reports the mode of entering the first migrant job and distinguishes be-
tween migrants with and without pre-arranged jobs. The latter left for destination
without a job waiting, the former had a job lined up. For each category, we distin-
guish workplace referrals, where a person intermediates and makes a job offer on
behalf of his employer, from indirect network-based entry where a main contact,
usually the person making a job offer, works elsewhere.15
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
For those with pre-arranged jobs, the ’other’ category includes recruitment through
labour contractors (9.8% of total) and formal labour market entry, e.g. job offers
after responding to private sector and government job advertisements (2.8% of
total). For those without prearranged jobs, the residual category (6.3% of total)
comprises ’orthodox’ destination job search and directly approaching a destination
spot market for skilled or unskilled labor.
Workplace referral is observed for 61.3% of these first migrant jobs.16 This esti-
mate tallies with the 2006 World Bank Microenterprise survey for India, the first
’large’ sample of small enterprises to record employee referral across sectors of a
developing economy. Using WB data, Table A1 (Online Appendix) shows a high
average incidence (above 50%): in garments and textiles more than 60% of new
hires were recruited through employee referral.
We next consider the main predictions of our theory and start with the strength
of the tie between referee and recruit. Table 3 shows that kin accounted for
78.4% of the referral observations with a member of the same household acting
as intermediary in 29% of these observations. Village friends and acquaintances
15Apart from the ‘indirect’ category there are a few instances where a migrant relies on the
assistance of a main contact (e.g. a more experienced migrant) for finding short term jobs in a
destination labour ‘chowk’ (spot market) or for setting up a business. For all referees and main
contacts, we collected information on relation to the migrant and job title.
16This is slightly below Munshi and Rosenzweig’s (2006) estimate of ‘referral’ in male blue
collar jobs in Mumbai: notice that our definition of workplace referral is more narrow and
precise.
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add up to 15.9%. The most important relations are ’other’ relatives.17 Our
descriptives thus suggest that strong, kinship-based social ties dominate weak ties
in referral-based entry into first migrant jobs.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
As noted, the second main prediction of our theory is that employers will use
employees with high stakes in the firm as referees. A plausible proxy for such
stakes is the status of the referee’s job. To examine the role of high stake referees,
we first rank jobs according to their status. The rich diversity of the jobs of
referees, main contacts and new migrants in our data-set is illustrated by the nine
job categories in Table A2 (Online Appendix).
Our initial ranking is informed by the Indian National Classification of Occupa-
tions (NCO 2004) which was derived from the ISCO occupational classification
of the ILO and officially modified to fit the Indian context.18 From these initial
nine, we simplify and compress the job categories down to three: enterprise own-
ers and skilled occupations are represented by category 1;19 apprentice jobs with
skill acquisition in progress and semi-skilled jobs are category 2. The distinguish-
ing characteristic of the bottom-tier, category 3 jobs is that these jobs combine
the NCO elementary occupation classification with with low status hard manual
labour, cleaning of utensils, equipment and other menial tasks.
Using these categories, consider our theory’s prediction that workplace referees are
in high stake, prestigious jobs. For the 176 migrants recruited through workplace
referral - as Figure 2 panel a) shows - 85.8% of the workplace referees are in
category 1 jobs while only 3.4% of referees are in bottom-tier, category 3 jobs.
17If interpreted too liberally, ’relative’ might blur the distinction between strong and weak
ties. The largest categories of ‘other relative’ in table 3 are cousins (32), uncles (30) and brother-
in-laws (17).
18In Table A2, category 1 comprises enterprise owners: bakery entrepreneurs is the largest such
group. Categories 2 to 9 are ranked according to the skill requirements of jobs. Category 2 covers
high skill and high prestige jobs, 3 are jobs with comparatively high skill intensity and category
4 skilled, but less skill-intensive. Category 5 are vendors, who are self-employed, respected and
often have useful connections. Category 6 are apprentice jobs that cover a spectrum of practical
and technical skills in the process of being acquired. Category 7 represents semi-skilled jobs
while categories 8 and 9 are physically demanding and unskilled manual jobs.
19Notice that this aggregration of skilled workers/referees into the single and heterogenous
category 1 does not affect the main results.
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A large majority of referees are thus in higher status, more skilled and higher
stake jobs. How does this occupational profile of referees compare with the status
and skill-profile of the jobs that migrants are recruited into? The contrast is
compelling: about 78% of the first migrant jobs are in categories 2 (36.4%) and 3
(42.0%), where the latter - as noted - make up the bottom tier.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 panel a) and FIGURE 2 panel b) ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 demonstrates that links to the owner or to employees in skilled and more
prestigious jobs within the hiring firm are crucial, even for acquiring predomi-
nantly low tier first migrant jobs.20
Summing up, these descriptives suggest a close correspondence between our the-
ory’s ’same workplace’, ’strong tie’ and ’high stake workplace referee’ predictions
and our data. We next consider whether plausible rival explanations for referral
can also account for these notable (and counterintuitive) hiring patterns. This is
followed by the regression-based assessments of our theory and of the same rival
explanations.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Assessing the merit of rival explanations
Table 4 summarises the predictions of our theory (MH) and of the five rival
explanations considered here. In addition to the information mechanism (i) and
the Montgomery (1991) selection or screening mechanism (ii), we consider the
sociality mechanism (iii), which we have not seen discussed in the literature.21 If
individuals enjoy working with relatives and friends, an employer can extract the
resulting rent and earn more profit by hiring through workplace referrals. The
improved matching explanation (Simon and Warner 1992) is the fourth (iv) and
20Do owners and employee referees differ in their recruitment behaviour? Our descriptives
suggest considerable overlap: in about one third of cases where owners recruit, they chose a
household member (compare with table 3). In 43 % of the same instances, the owner recruited
another relative. The theory suggets that an employer who chooses a relative or close friend is
motivated by ensuring low opportunism via social preferences.
21We are grateful to a reviewer for this suggestion.
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favoritism or nepotism (e.g. Bramoulle and Goyal 2016) the fifth (v) and final
mechanism. As above, the status of the referee’s job is our proxy for stakes in
recruit performance while turnover is our moral hazard proxy. We first examine
the consistency between predictions and descriptives (Table 4, panel A), before
empirically assessing the performance of ability, wage penalty and labor turnover
predictions (Table 4, panel B).
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
4.1.1 The social tie and high stake referee predictions
Starting with the information explanation (Table 4, panel A, column 2), existing
employees are likely to acquire early and privileged information about a job va-
cancy. This information advantage could explain why job entry through workplace
insiders is so prevalent. While such ’information dissemination’ roles of networks
are often alluded to (e.g. Wahba and Zenou 2005), this is hard to reconcile with
our strong tie job entry observations since weak tie job search and information
dissemination would be more efficient (Granovetter 1973). If information dissem-
ination was the main driver of referral in our sample, we would expect migrants
to find jobs through low-skilled, entry level workers (rather than high stake refer-
ees) since entry level workers (a) are likely to be more numerous than other staff
in the average sample enterprise and (b) are the type of contacts a low-skilled,
representative job seeker is particularly likely to know.
For the main screening or selection explanation for referral (column 3), Mont-
gomery (1991) assumes homophily or assortative matching in employee networks:
by recruiting through the networks of talented (or more productive) staff, employ-
ers can mitigate informational asymmetries about ability or other valuable, hard
to observe candidate traits. If correct, we would expect similar referee-recruit jobs
and weak referee-recruit ties: both contrast starkly with our descriptives.
We next consider the sociality explanation (column 4). While consistent with our
strong tie observations, it seems reasonable to expect the referee and the recruit
to be in similar jobs: this is, again, different from what we observe. For the
matching explanation (column 5), neither a strong tie nor high referee stakes are
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required. Finally, the favoritism explanation (column 6) is plausibly consistent
with our strong tie and high stake referee observations.
Summing up, while the high stake and strong social tie patterns in our data
are consistent with our theory, partly consistent with the sociality explanation
and consistent with the favoritism explanation, they are hard to reconcile with
the other rival explanations. To progress, we empirically assess the ability, wage
penalty and turnover predictions of our theory and of the same rival explanations.
4.1.2 Referral and (unobserved) recruit ability
Table 4, panel B, outlines the worker ability predictions. To be advantageous
for the recruiting firm, the unobserved ability of workers recruited through our
referral mechanism should be at least on par with other recruits (column 1). Given
the influence of Montgomery (1991), we examine whether individuals recruited
through referral have superior unobservable traits.
At the end of each migrant interview, we implemented a simplified Raven-type
innate ability test. One advantage of such a test is its claimed neutrality to culture
and to a person’s educational and other exposure (e.g. Boissiere, Knight and Sabot
1985). Raven-type progressive matrices tests have, accordingly, been widely used
in developing country settings, including in Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zhao’s
(2013) poverty and cognitive performance research. Our abridged six matrices test
was implemented in a careful, standardised manner that closely resembled Mani
et al.’s (2013) approach (see Online Appendix Figure A1).
In Table 5 below, the binary dependent variable takes the value 1 if individual i
was recruited through workplace referral and 0 otherwise. If referral is a screening
device for unobserved worker ability, the coefficient on the Raven type test score
should be positive and statistically significant. Column (1) reports the test score
coefficient: in column (2), the test score is replaced with a dummy that takes the
value 1 if individual i was among the top 10% test performers. Columns (3) and
(4) repeat (1) and (2) while including controls for individual, workplace and other
relevant characteristics. As Table 5 shows, there are no signs of referral screening
for worker ability: in fact, the R square in columns (1) and (2) is equal to zero.
21
Both the sociality and the favoritism explanation - provided that favoritism brings
in less able recruits - predict a negative and significant Raven type test coefficient
in table 5. The table 5 results are, accordingly, not consistent with these two rival
explanations.
At the outset, the insignificance of the Raven coefficient could simply reflect that
our ability test failed to capture the worker traits that matter in the labour mar-
kets of interest. However, the wage regression in Table 7 below highlights the
relevance of our ability measure in these labour markets: a high Raven type test
score is strongly and positively correlated with a worker’s real wage.22
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 Wage penalty and labor turnover
4.2.1 Referral wage penalty
Our theory predicts that employers pay efficiency wages in jobs where the costs of
worker opportunism exceed a threshold. Above the threshold, workers recruited
through referral should face a wage penalty compared to those finding a similar
job through the market/other channels. We use our entry wage data to examine
this wage penalty prediction. Since first migrations occurred over an extensive
time period, we first convert monthly nominal to real wages using the All India
Consumer Price Index for industrial workers (CPI (IW)).23 24
Two routes to examining this prediction are, first, to use exacting data on the
costs of worker opportunism by job type to attempt to estimate the threshold and
make comparisons of referred and non-referred worker wages above and below this
22Note that insignificance in the referral regressions could still reflect limited power due to
our small sample size. These findings should therefore be interpreted with caution.
23In these labour markets, wages are not always observed. Apprentices are often not paid a
wage: similarly, a son starting in the family enterprise may not have a clearly defined wage.
These observations could be included as zeroes (ln(0) + 1), or dropped. For the results reported
below, we drop observations with a zero wage.
24The Labour Bureau reports the index from 1968 onwards (see
http://labourbureau.nic.in/CPI%20IW%20Prev%20Indexes.htm). For the period 1955-
1968, we use the Economic Survey (1968-69, table 5-2) which is available from
http://indiabudget.nic.in/previouses.asp
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threshold. A pragmatic and inferential approach is to draw on historical parallels
and evidence of worker discipline challenges in the context of interest and look for
a threshold combining the above job classifications with data on wages.
While absenteeism and retention remain major employer concerns in India, the
average annual labour turnover in manufacturing jobs in the United States as
recently as the 1920s was 100 percent, with 200-400 percent turnover not unusual
(James 1960). In developing country settings, we expect accentuated worker dis-
cipline challenges in informal jobs because of the limited scope for contract en-
forcement.
Table 6 reports average entry real wages (in natural log form) for job category
1 to 3, comparing referred and non-referred recruits. While real wages decline
monotonically by job type for workers recruited through referral, a referral wage
penalty is discernible only for workers in bottom-tier (category 3) jobs: this wage
penalty is statistically significant at a 1% level.
Table 6 thus suggests that firms in our sample, on average, pay bottom tier
workers recruited through referral less than similar workers recruited through
other channels.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
It is evident that this wage penalty could simply reflect observable and unobserv-
able quality differences between referred and non-referred recruits. To sharpen
our comparison, we thus and next filter out unobserved and other worker charac-
teristics and other relevant covariates.
Conditional on being a migrant, what determines a job entrant‘s real wage in
the urban destinations and labor markets where meaningful wage comparisons
between referred and non-referred workers can be made? Table 7, column 1,
reports a simple, orthodox Mincerian wage equation with the real entry wage
as dependent variable: on the right hand side we include standard, observable
individual characteristics: education is represented by three dummy variables for
the level of schooling completed:25 age at migration proxies work experience. The
dummy for the top 10% Raven score controls for unobserved, individual ability.
25The results do not change if years of schooling replaces the educational dummies.
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We also include dummy variables for the main sector of work and for belonging
to the largest social group. Finally, we include destination dummies to control for
distance and other destination unobservables.
To assess the wage penalty prediction, we include a referral dummy, the referral
dummy interacted with a category 3 job and a category 3 job control. While
the referral and category 3 job dummy coefficients are statistically insignificant,
the category 3 interaction term is consistent with table 6 and a wage penalty in
bottom tier jobs for workers recruited through referral.
While supportive of our theory, a referral wage penalty is not consistent with
Simon and Warner’s (1992) matching explanation, which predicts an initial wage
premium. It is also not consistent with the favoritism/nepotism mechanism which
predicts lower wages if referred workers have inferior individual traits: we reiterate
that our Raven type test does not support this ’favoritism as costly for the firm’
conjecture.26
Given our inferential approach, the finding that the wage penalty prediction is
supported for bottom tier jobs is original and interesting but needs to be inter-
preted with caution and as suggestive.
4.2.2 Labor turnover
To substantiate the relevance of retention challenges in bottom tier jobs, Table
A3 (Online Appendix) presents a t-test of the share of short term labour turnover
for referred and non-referred workers in category 3 jobs.
Short term retention challenges are nontrivial: 30% of the non-referred workers
had left within six months of joining their first migrant job. For workers recruited
through referral, 13% had left within six months. In addition, workers recruited
through referral had 64% (or 14 months) longer workspells in their first migrant
26For the other rival explanations in Table 4, the information mechanism makes no wage
predictions, while Montgomery’s (1991) screening mechanism predicts a referral wage premium
since referred workers (on average) should be more able and productive. The predictions of the
sociality mechanism plausibly overlap with our model. Notice that Kugler (2003:532) predicts
a wage premium since workplace referrals “generate segmentation in the labor market: referrals
match ‘good’ high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods match less
attractive jobs to less-connected workers”.
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jobs than those hired through other channels. Both differences are significant at
a 5% level. Adding controls, columns 2 and 3 in Table 7 report regressions with
short term retention and workspell duration (in months) as dependent variables:
it is evident that recruitment through referral correlates with significantly lower
turnover and significantly longer workspells. Notice that there is no sign of referral
acting as a disciplining device in other types of jobs: as a device for controlling
turnover, employer advantages of referral appears to be strictly confined to bottom
tier, category 3 jobs.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Keeping bottom-tier workers sufficiently content not to leave, given the strenuous
manual labour and other menial, low-status tasks in often unattractive work envi-
ronments, presents the informal enterprises in our sample with serious challenges
and offer a plausible rationale for the strong tie and high stake referee referral
patterns that we observe. While the high turnovers resonate with history and
with Blattman and Dercon (2018), the turnover curbing effects of referral are also
consistent with Simon and Warner (1992).
These turnover results are not, however, fully consistent with the notion of an
efficiency wage equilibrium in our model. In equilibrium, and conditional on
efficiency wage payments, the turnover of referred and other workers should be
the same, but lower than turnover among workers who are paid reservation wages.
That referred workers stay longer than non-referred workers in bottom-tier jobs
is suggestive of a mixture of efficiency and reservation wage payments to non-
referred workers. If this is correct, the positive referral effect on turnovers and
workspells in bottom tier jobs should be driven by a higher turnover among the
subset of non-referred workers who are not paid efficiency wages.27
Our wage data facilitate a check of this conjecture. As reported in Table A4 (On-
line Appendix), while the average wages of non-referred workers in bottom tier
27To be explicit, let x be the fraction of workers in bottom tier jobs who are paid reservation
wages, w and 1−x the fraction paid efficiency wages, wS..w denotes referral wage. Let tR denote
turnover among referred workers in these jobs and tS , turnover among non referred workers who
are paid efficiency wages while t0 represents the turnover among non referred workers who get
paid w in these jobs. Then we have, in our data, wR < x.w+(1−x)wS and tR < t0(x)+tS(1−x).
In equilibrium, our model predicts that tR = tS . Thus the second inequality can be simplified
to (tR − t0)x < 0. Hence, as long as x > 0, it is possible for both inequalities to hold.
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jobs are higher (because of the referral wage penalty), the turnover in the bot-
tom half of the wage distribution is significantly lower among workers recruited
through referral than among workers recruited through other channels. In con-
trast, the turnover difference in the upper half of the wage distribution is not
significantly different from 0. This provides suggestive support for the idea that
the referral/non-referral turnover difference is driven by higher turnover among
non-referred workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution who, we assume,
are paid reservation wages.
5 Conclusion
We present a new theoretical model where firms use employee referral to curb
moral hazard in the workplace. Employers can exploit the social tie between a
workplace referee and a new recruit to leverage desirable recruit behaviour at a
lower cost. This mechanism will only work when existing staff with high stakes
in recruit performance can be mobilized as referees: our model predicts a strong
tie between a referee and a recruit in this case.
A high prevalence of such referrals in a labour market requires that strong tie
networks can be leveraged to supply suitable job candidates. This capacity on
the part of strong tie networks is particularly plausible for low and unskilled
jobs which are jobs that anyone in principle can do. The prevalence of low and
unskilled occupations, informality (e.g. Kotwal et al 2011), limited scope for
contract enforcement, informational constraints and hard working conditions (e.g.
Blattman and Dercon 2018) make our theory especially relevant for developing
country settings.
Results from the empirical literature and our descriptive statistics support the
main and somewhat counterintuitive predictions of our model: we observe a high
incidence of referral which is consistent with WB (2006) (Table A1) and Munshi
and Rosenzweig’s (2006) findings for blue collar workers in Mumbai. We also find
entry through a strong social tie to be common. While referees, as predicted, are
in more prestigious, high stake jobs, recruitment typically occurs into manual,
bottom tier jobs (Figure 2).
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To shed further light on the relevance of our theory, we first examined whether
alternative theories and explanations for referral could also account for these no-
table patterns in our data (Table 4, panel A): the information and the Montgomery
(1991) selection (screening) explanations are hard to reconcile with our observa-
tions. For the sociality explanation, we would expect the referee and the recruit
to be in the same type of jobs which contrasts with what we observe.
Using Raven-type test data, our findings are consistent with our moral hazard
explanation, but provide little support for referral screening for unobserved worker
ability or for the other rival explanations. For the nepotism explanation, the
conjecture that ’favoritism is costly for the firm’ - through lower recruit ability -
is not supported.
For the more specific predictions of our model, which are consistent with but offer
more nuance than Antoninis (2006) and Heath (2018),28 we find a wage penalty for
workers recruited through referral but only into bottom tier jobs: these informal,
low status jobs involve hard manul labor and likely acute retention and discipline
problems. Montgomery (1991), Kugler (2003) and Simon and Warner (1992)
all predict a referral wage premium, which is inconsistent with our observations:
there would be no referral wage penalty after controlling for worker ability if the
’favoritism as costly for the firm’ explanation was correct.
Our labor turnover findings are in line with historical and ethnographic evidence,
with official data and with e.g. recent observations of retention challenges in
manufacturing jobs in Ethiopia. As discussed (and formalised in footnote 27),
the finding of a turnover-reducing referral effect in bottom tier jobs is consistent
with a situation where the comparator group of non-referred workers are paid a
mixture of efficiency and reservation wages. Finally, our simple wage regression
verified the relevance of our unobserved ability measure in the jobs and labour
markets of interest: we find a large positive correlation between a top Raven-type
test score and wages in these labour markets.
We reiterate that our findings are based on data from a small sample and from
two villages and should therefore be treated with caution, as suggestive and, we
hope, as a starting point for new research. While the main rival explanations
28Since we find a wage penalty after controlling for recruit ability.
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may contribute to the high job entry through workplace insiders, they are hard to
reconcile with the observations and analyses presented here. Our results support
Kugler’s (2003) and Heath’s (2018) work which see moral hazard as an important
driver of workplace referrals, but add fine-grained empirical observations and new
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Table 1. Migration pattern by social group
Ansaris Chamars Others
Share of migrant sample 48.4% (139) 34.1% (98) 17.4%(50)
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Table 2. Mode of job entry
N Share
Pre-arranged 88.9%
Workplace referral 167 58.2%
Indirect 52 18.1%
Other 36 12.6%
Not pre-arranged 11.1 %




Table 3. Social ties and workplace referral
Relation to referee N Percentage Cumulative
Member of the same household 51 29.0% 29.0%
Other relative 87 49.4% 78.4%
Village friend 7 4.0% 82.4%
Village acquaintance 21 11.9% 94.3%
Friend from elsewhere 2 1.1% 95.4%
Acquaintance from elsewhere 6 3.5% 98.9%
Other 2 1.1% 100%
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No difference No difference Lower  Lower  No prediction 
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Table 5. Raven type test score and referrals
Workpl ref Workpl ref Workpl ref Workpl ref
Raven type test score 0.020 0.019
(0.026) (0.028)
Raven top 10% 0.011 0.009
(0.097) (0.11)
Individual controls no no yes yes
Workplace controls no no yes yes
Destination dummies no no yes yes
R squared 0.002 0.000 0.25 0.25
Observations 268 268 266 266
Note: OLS with robust SEs (in parentheses). ***,**,* significant at 1, 5 and 10 % level. Individual controls:
age at migration; dummies for primary (class 1-5), secondary (class 6-10) and higher education (Above class 10).
Other controls: bakery sector dummy, destination dummies.
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Table 6. Mean real entry wage: referred vs non-referred workers
Job type N Referred workers Non-referred workers Difference
Category 1 55 6.35 (32) 6.35 (23) 0.00
Category 2 80 5.47 (52) 5.56 (28) -0.09
Category 3 127 5.09 (70) 5.75 (57) -0.66***
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Table 7. Determinants of real wage, job turnover and workspell
Real entry wage Short term turnover





Referral 0.084 0.14* -5.70
(0.16) (0.07) (10.04)
Referral X category 3 job dummy -0.43** -0.30*** 23.3*
(0.21) (0.11) (11.85)
Category 3 job dummy -0.0466 0.112 -29.04***
(0.167) (0.093) (9.46)
Age at migration 0.037*** -0.014*** 2.52***
(0.01) (0.004) (0.90)
Raven top 10 % 0.50*** -0.028 -18.56**
(0.15) (0.08) (9.29)
Primary 0.084 -0.002 -6.46
(0.16) (0.07) (8.55)
Secondary 0.057 0.087* -19.42**
(0.12) (0.071) (7.75)
Higher 0.062 0.08 -29.15**
(0.227) (0.14) (11.96)
Ansari -0.27** -0.30*** 10.15
(0.135) (0.08) (9.14)
Bakery -0.104 0.13 -3.82
0.147 0.08 7.73
Destination dummies YES YES YES
R2 0.31 0.19 0.24
N 259 258 258
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